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The Relevance of International Spillovers and 
Asymmetric Effects in the Taylor Rule 
Joscha Beckmann, Ansgar Belke and Christian Dreger* 
CEPS Working Document No. 403 / February 2015 
1. Introduction 
Since the 1980s, central banks switched to policies based on rules, with strong emphasis on 
price stability. The Taylor rule has become popular to describe the monetary policy stance in 
both advanced and developing countries (Taylor, 1993). It links policy interest rates to 
deviations of inflation from its target and real output from its potential. According to the 
Taylor principle, the central bank should raise the nominal interest rate by more than one 
percentage point for each 1% increase in inflation. Taylor (1993) emphasised the importance 
of rule-like behaviour on part of central banks as a key framework to ensure time-consistency, 
monetary transparency, and independence. 
While policy rates have been broadly in line with the Taylor rule during the Great Moderation, 
they have been persistently moving below it in both advanced and developing countries since 
the turn of the century. The monetary accommodation implied by these deviations have been 
blamed as a potential factor in the build-up of imbalances in the period before the financial 
crisis (Kahn, 2010). Therefore, their explanation is of high academic and policy relevance. 
A straightforward extension of the traditional Taylor rule is based on the idea of accounting 
for international spillovers. There are several reasons why international linkages have become 
more important. On the one hand, declining real interest rates may have introduced an 
upward bias in the Taylor rule, i.e. an overestimation of nominal interest rates implied by the 
Taylor rate. Capital inflows from emerging markets to the industrial countries might have led 
to lower real interest rates, as stated by the savings glut hypothesis. In general, the savings 
glut was in large part a result of policies that emerging market economies put in place when 
the global economy started to recover from the 2000-01 recession (Bernanke 2005 and 2007)1. 
Underdeveloped financial markets in the emerging countries restricted the ability of their 
citizens to borrow against future income and redirected their savings to industrial countries, 
in particular to the US. Asset shortages triggered a reduction of the equilibrium real interest 
rates at a global scale (Caballero, Fahri and Gourinchas, 2008). This development might also 
reflect secular demographic trends in the industrial countries, specifically strong asset demand 
exerted by the baby boomer generation. A further explanation refers to an increase in the 
perceived riskiness of capital assets in the wake of asset price booms and busts after the turn 
                                                   
* Belke (Corresponding Author, University of Duisburg-Essen and Centre for European Policy Studies 
(CEPS Brussels), ansgar.belke@uni-due.de. Beckmann: University of Duisburg-Essen and Kiel Institute 
for the World Economy. Dreger: German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin). We would like 
to thank the participants of the 2014 annual conference of the German Economic Association (VfS) in 
Hamburg for their valuable comments. 
1 The argument posits that an excess supply of savings - particularly in emerging Asian countries - 
helped to generate a US current account deficit as savings had to flow somewhere. The US was the main 
destination and – due to its huge and non-fragmented bond market – also a capable recipient of the 
savings. See also Belke and Gros (2014). 
2  BECKMANN, BELKE & DREGER 
 
of the century. Therefore, policy interest rates fell below the Taylor rule levels in close synchronisation 
across countries. For example, Hofmann and Bogdanova (2012) have argued that deviations 
from the Taylor rule can be best interpreted as a change in the global equilibrium real interest 
rate. 
A further transmission channel for international spillovers stems from the fact that central 
banks no longer decide on policy rates in an independent way (Taylor, 2013). While interest 
rates have been set according to national conditions up to the turn of the century, policy 
reactions have been increasingly affected by the international environment since then. Hence, 
the deviations might indicate a substantial shift in the monetary policy regime. Among others, 
Kim (2000) demonstrated that US monetary policy shocks can affect other countries. Belke and 
Gros (2005) provided evidence that the ECB followed the Fed in its interest rate decisions. In 
fact, low US interest rates can increase risk-taking in other countries, and one option to react 
is to lower interest rates, see Bruno and Shin (2012). In addition, central banks tend to resist 
large exchange rate appreciations, and adjust their interest rates according to the behaviour of 
other central banks. Most importantly, the actions of the Federal Reserve Bank have been 
magnified due to the mimicking responses of other central banks (Gray, 2012). Overall, 
deviations from a Taylor rule can amplify due to international spillovers (Taylor, 2013). 
Deviations can also occur due to asymmetric behaviour by the central banks. For example, 
interest rate reaction functions can be different in expansionary and restrictive periods of 
monetary policy. This distinction may hold independently of an impact of international 
spillovers. Asymmetric responses lead to nonlinear Taylor rules as recently proposed by Riedl 
and Brüggemann (2011), among others. Such explanations might be better able to capture the 
evolution of policy rates. Expansionary and contractionary monetary decisions might be based 
on a different set of determinants. In this vein, Alcidi et al. (2009) show that linear Taylor rules 
fail to detect policy decisions driven by policy-makers' judgment while smooth transition 
models are well-suited to improve linear Taylor reaction functions.  
This paper examines the causes for the deviations from the standard Taylor rule by analysing 
the importance of both international spillovers and nonlinearities for monetary policy decisions in 
the main industrial countries, i.e. the US, the Euro Area, the UK and Japan. A simple linear 
benchmark model is chosen as a point of departure and extended step by step. After 
incorporating international spillovers via foreign interest rates, nonlinear dynamics are 
examined through a smooth transition approach. Several variables steering the transition 
between the regimes are considered, such as lagged interest rate changes, the output gap, oil 
prices and lagged differentials between domestic and foreign interest rates. Our empirical 
results suggest that both incorporating international spillovers and, even more important, 
allowing for nonlinear dynamics are important to improve the Taylor reaction function to explain 
actual monetary policy behaviour. International spillovers seem to be more important in 
periods of increasing interest rates, with the exception of the euro area. This appears consistent 
with recent evidence by the IMF in its spillover reports in the context of the envisaged Fed’s 
exit from unconventional monetary policies (IMF, 2013). 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section (Section 2) reviews the 
Taylor rule specification. Section 3 documents the deviations from the linear model and 
discusses the extension of the Taylor principle by international spillovers. In Section 4 
nonlinear specifications are presented. Section 5 holds the empirical results. Finally, Section 6 
concludes with some policy implications. 
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2. Deviations from the Taylor rule 
The Taylor rule establishes a linear relationship between the nominal interest rate, inflation 
and the output gap. In its standard form 
(1) ݅௧ = ݎ∗ + ߨ∗ + ߙଵ(ߨ௧ − ߨ∗) + ߙଶݕ௧ + ߝ௧  
i is the nominal policy determined interest rate, r* is the long-run equilibrium real interest rate, 
π* stands for the central bank’s inflation objective, π represents the actual inflation rate, and y 
is the output gap, i.e. the deviation of actual and potential output, expressed as a percentage 
of the latter. The error ε fulfils the white noise properties and the index t denotes time. The 
parameters describe how strong the policy interest rate should respond to deviations of 
inflation from its target and of output from its potential. The Taylor rule implies that central 
banks aim to stabilise inflation around its target and output around its potential. Positive 
(negative) deviations of the two variables from the respective levels would be associated with 
a tightening (loosening) of the monetary policy stance. An inflation reaction coefficient (α1) 
above one ensures that real interest rates respond to inflationary pressures (Taylor, 1993, 1998). 
In that case an increase in inflation triggers a rise in the real interest rate. 
Central banks often prefer to adjust policy rates not instantaneously, but gradually with small, 
distinct steps in a particular direction. If they partially adjust towards desired levels, interest 
rate smoothing can be incorporated through the inclusion of the lagged policy rate (Judd and 
Rudebusch, 1998). 
(2) ݅௧ = ߩ݅௧ିଵ + (1 − ߩ)(ݎ∗ + ߨ∗ + ߙଵ(ߨ௧ − ߨ∗) + ߙଶݕ௧) + ߝ௧  
The higher the weight of the lagged policy rate, the slower is the adjustment to intended 
interest rate levels.2 The lagged interest rate could be also seen as a proxy of further 
determinants of the policy rate which are less important and therefore excluded from the 
specification. Equations (1) and (2) are ex post specifications of the Taylor rule, i.e. setting of 
interest rates is conditional to contemporaneous inflation and the output gap. If monetary 
policy acts with a delay of k periods, a forward-looking (ex-ante) specification 
(3) ݅௧ = ߩ݅௧ିଵ + (1 − ߩ)(ݎ∗ + ߨ∗ + ߙଵ(ܧ௧ߨ௧ା௞ − ߨ∗) + ߙଶܧ௧ݕ௧ା௞) + ߝ௧  
may be more appropriate, where E denotes the rational expectations operator (Clarida, Galí 
and Gertler, 2000). Nominal interest rates depend on their past levels, the expected deviations 
of inflation from its target and output from its long run potential. Expectations exploit all 
information available at time when the prediction is made. Nominal interest rates fluctuate 
around a constant equilibrium level, the latter defined as the sum of the real interest rate and 
the inflation target. It should be noted, that the Taylor rule acts as a rule of thumb and leaves 
out many factors that might be actually relevant for monetary policy, for example, the risk that 
the policy rate hits the zero lower bound. 
Many empirical studies demonstrated that monetary policy of advanced countries can, to a 
lesser or larger extent, be explained by this kind of reaction function. Despite of the persistence 
of policy rates, the reaction coefficient of the inflation gap tends to be larger than unity and to 
exceed the coefficient of the output gap, especially in more recent periods of monetary history. 
                                                   
2 In contrast, nominal interest rates have been cut aggressively towards the zero lower bound during 
the global financial crisis to avoid output losses, especially after the Lehman collapse (see Gerlach and 
Lewis, 2011). 
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Moreover, forward-looking models seem to fit the actual behaviour of central banks slightly 
better than contemporaneous versions. For example, Orphanides (2001, 2003) used real-time 
instead of ex-post revised data. As the main interest in the relevance of international spillovers 
and nonlinearities, a distinction between real time and revised estimates is less important in 
this paper, as these issues are relevant in both datasets.  
Since the turn of the century, however, deviations of actual policy rates from the Taylor rule 
increased. In particular, actual nominal interest rates fell persistently below the levels implied 
by the Taylor rule, suggesting a loose stance of monetary policy in the period before the 
financial crisis. According to Clarida (2012), the differences turn out to be slightly smaller if ex 
ante rates are considered. But the deviations might have also been caused by the omission of 
explanatory factors, such as international spillovers and asymmetric policy responses (Taylor, 
2013). Note in this context that an exclusion of relevant variables might erroneously be 
interpreted as a change in the reaction coefficients with regard to the other variables, i.e. 
inflation and the output gap. Hence, we have to look at international spillovers and non-
linearities. 
3. Linear specifications of Taylor rules 
Quarterly data are obtained from the OECD Main Economic indicators and cover the 1982:1 
to 2008:4 period. In contrast to, for instance, Belke and Klose (2013), our main aim is to consider 
the period of conventional monetary policy, as in Taylor (2013). The starting point of our 
analysis is motivated by the end of the so-called ‘pseudo monetarism’ policy of the Fed 
(Timberlake, 1993). As said, we exclude the developments during the recent financial crisis as 
the main interest is in the deviations from the rule prior to the crisis. Three months interbank 
interest rates are used. Inflation is measured as the percentage of the quarter-on-quarter 
change of prices inflation, i.e. 100*log(pt/pt-1), where p denotes the consumer price index. 
Potential output is obtained by the HP Filter (lambda = 1600) applied to real GDP. The output 
gap is then determined by the difference between actual and potential GDP, expressed as a 
percentage of the latter. An output gap beyond (below) 100 percent thus indicates excess 
(under-) utilization of capacity. 
Table 1. Linear Estimations 
  Constant ࡳࢇ࢖ ࡵࡺࡲࡳ ࢤࡵ࢚ି૚ ࢤࡵ࢚ି૛ 
US 
3.983*** 0.087 1.323*** -0.309 -0.346 
[10.979] [0.460] [5.901] [-0.851] [-0.794] 
UK 
5.824*** 0.063 1.206*** 0.220 0.119 
[27.830] [0.365] [10.229] [0.805] [0.496] 
Japan 
4.767*** 0.080 1.761*** -0.561 -0.388 
[14.912] [0.774] [12.297] [-1.208] [-0.838] 
  2.601  -0.043  0.807  0.5780  0.5567 
Euro area [6.745] [-0.29854] [2.549] [0.863] [0.876] 
Note: * Statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level. 
T-values are given in parentheses. 
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Figure 1. Deviations from a linear Taylor rule 
 
 
The analysis is conducted for the US, the euro area, the UK and Japan. As official euro area 
series are not available before 1999, German data are used instead in the previous period and 
the series in the following period are denoted as “euro area” data. See also von Hagen and 
Fratianni (1990) for this strategy. As a starting point, the linear Taylor rule is estimated via 
OLS and taken as a benchmark. To account for partial adjustment and serial correlation, the 
first two lagged interest changes are also included (Table 1). 
The estimated coefficients are in line with theoretical predictions. Nonetheless, the output gap 
coefficient can be frequently considered as insignificant because of high standard errors. The 
inspection of the deviations from the respective country-specific rules shows that the Taylor 
principle is a reasonable approximation of monetary policy until the turn of the century, more 
or less (Figure 1). Outliers during the 1990s might be explained by particular events such as 
the start of the deflationary period in Japan. However, the limitations of the standard model 
became more pronounced since then. Therefore, explicitly taking into account international 
spillovers and asymmetric adjustment of central banks might be envisaged to capture 
monetary policy behaviour.  
To control for international spillovers, we extend the Taylor reaction function by adding the 
foreign interest rate. The latter is proxied by the US rate for the euro area, the UK and Japan. 
For the US, we employ a linear combination of interest rates in the euro area, UK and Japan. 
The weights used for this purpose reflect the relevance of the respective currencies in the 
international reserves held by the US. It should be noted that the evidence exhibited in Table 
2 is robust to this choice.3 
  
                                                   
3 Detailed results are available from the authors upon request. 
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Table 2. Linear Estimations including foreign interest rate 
  Constant ࡳࢇ࢖ ࡵࡺࡲࡳ ࢤࡵ࢚ି૚ ࢤࡵ࢚ି૛ ࢏ࢌ࢚ି૚ 
US 
4.455*** 0.153 1.395*** -0.233 -0.315 0.323*** 
[13.026] [0.798] [6.330] [-0.0756] [-0.816] [3.107] 
UK 
3.666*** 0.158 0.751*** -0.014 -0.134 0.467*** 
[7.009] [1.065] [7.935] [-0.056] [-0.627] [4.641] 
Japan 
1.227* 0.175 1.124*** -0.978** -0.818 0.476*** 
[1.792] [2.293] [5.987] [-2.529] [-2.148] [10.979] 
  2.373***  0.019  0.6634*  0.5635  -0.3954 0.368*** 
Germany [4,675] [0.197] [3.083] [1.429] [-0.998] [3.931] 
Note: * Statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level. 
T-values are given in parentheses. 
 
Figure 2. Deviations from a linear Taylor rule including the foreign interest rate 
 
Compared to the standard model, the coefficients of inflation and output are largely 
unchanged except for the euro area where the output gap becomes significant, although with 
a wrong sign. The foreign interest rate is highly relevant for each economy, except for the US 
where the coefficient is significant but of small size. Hence, the US monetary policy might 
matter for other countries, but not vice versa. The deviations from the rule displayed in Figure 
2 have declined, but they are still pronounced even in the extended model. Hence, the 
inclusion of international spillovers is not sufficient to solve the puzzle. Therefore, nonlinear 
dynamics are considered as a further improvement. 
4. Nonlinear specifications of Taylor rules 
4.1 Exponential and logistic smooth transition models 
Smooth regression models suggested by Teräsvirta (1994, 1998) provide a convenient 
framework to capture nonlinear dynamics in the Taylor reaction function (see Alcidi et al., 
2009 and Brüggemann and Riedel, 2012). Compared to specifications with discrete structural 
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breaks, these models allow for gradual change between two regimes. In the extended Taylor 
rule specification  
(4) ݅௧ୀ[ߙଵ + ߚଵ(ݕ௧) + ߚଶ(ߨ௧ − ߨ௧∗) + ߚଷ(݅௧ିଵ∗ )] + [ߚଵᇱ(ݕ௧) + ߚଶᇱ(ߨ௧ − ߨ௧∗) +
																																ߚଷ
ᇱ(݅௧ିଵ∗ )]ܨ(ݖ௧ ,ߛ, ܿ) + 	 ݑ௧ା௞ , 
ܨ(ݖ௧ ,ߛ, ܿ) is a transition function which ascertains the speed of adjustment between the 
regimes and can have either a logistic or an exponential shape. The coefficients ߙଵ and ߚ௜  
correspond to the lower regime, and (ߙଵ + ߙଵᇱ) and (ߚ௜ + ߚ௜ᇱ) to the upper regime (van Dijk 
et al., 2002). An exponential and a logistic transition function are close substitutes and relate 
to distinct patterns of nonlinearity. A logistic transition allows for different parameters above 
and below a threshold, while an exponential transition accounts for a distinction between 
small and large deviations from a threshold. The choice between the alternatives can be made 
according to economic arguments. For example, if the aim is to distinguish between regimes 
of increasing and decreasing interest rates, a logistic transition could be adopted. Brüggemann 
and Riedl (2011) and Alcidi et al. (2009) have provided evidence that the logistic smooth 
transition approach is a viable alternative to linear monetary policy reaction functions. 
However, exponential specifications might be preferred if the transition between the regimes 
relies on some kind of interest rate differential.  
To explain the underlying dynamics, consider the case where ܨ(ݖ௧ ,ߛ, ܿ) is a continuous logistic 
transition function bounded between 0 and 1:  
(5) ܨ(ݖ௧ ,ߛ, ܿ) = [1 + exp	(−ߛ(ݖ௧ − ܿ)/ߪ௭௧)]ିଵ    with  ߛ > 0. 
It implies that the lower (upper) regime is associated with negative (positive) values of the 
transition variable ݖ	௧ relative to the location parameter ܿ. The logistic function rises 
monotonically from 0 to 1 as the transition variable increases, i.e. ܨ(ݖ௧ ,ߛ, ܿ) → 0 as ݖ௧ → −∞ 
and ܨ(ݖ௧ ,ߛ, ܿ) → 1 as ݖ௧ → +∞, while it is equal to 0.5 if ݖ௧ = ܿ. The location parameter can 
be interpreted as a threshold dividing equation (4) into three different extreme regimes 
corresponding to lim
௭೟→ିஶ
	ܨ(ݖ௧ ,ߛ, ܿ), lim
௭೟→ାஶ
	ܨ(ݖ௧ ,ߛ, ܿ) and 	ݖ௧ = ܿ. In the case of ݖ௧ = ܿ, 
equation (4) reduces to the linear model (3), where ߙ = ߙଵ + 0.5ߙଶ and ߚ = ߚ௜ + 0.5ߚ௜ᇱ. 
Moreover, the smoothness parameter ߛ controls the speed of transition between the extreme 
regimes (Baillie and Kilic, 2006). 
The second possibility we consider for some specifications corresponds to ܨ(ݖ௧ ,ߛ, ܿ) as a 
bounded continuous exponential transition function which lies between 0 and 1 and thus has 
the following functional form: 
ܨ(ݖ௧ ,ߛ, ܿ) = 1 − exp	(−ߛ(ݖ௧ − ܿ)ଶ/ߪ௭௧) with ߛ > 0 (6) 
where ݖ௧ indicates the transition variable, ߪ௭௧  represents its standard deviation, ߛ denotes a 
slope parameter and ܿ is a location parameter. The transition function given by Equation (6) is 
symmetrically U-shaped as ܨ(ݖ௧ ,ߛ, ܿ) → 1 for ݖ௧ → ±∞ and ܨ(ݖ௧ ,ߛ, ܿ) → 0	for ݖ௧ = ܿ. Hence, the 
adjustment for deviations of the transition variable ݖ௧  above and below ܿ, which can be 
interpreted as a threshold value, is symmetric, as opposed to the logistic case mentioned 
below. The slope parameter ߛ determines the speed of the transition between the extreme 
regimes, with lower absolute values implying slower transition. 
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4.2 Choice of the transition variable 
By modelling the dynamics in a nonlinear form, transition variables need to be specified in 
advance. As the results might depend on this selection, different transition variables should 
be considered to assess the robustness of the results. A straightforward choice is the lagged 
change of the interest rate compared to the threshold c which is restricted to be zero. In this case, 
the different regimes correspond to periods of declining or rising interest rates, i.e. to different 
stances of the business cycle and/or different stances of monetary policy (negative change for 
expansionary and positive change for contractionary policy). As an alternative, the lagged 
output gap is selected to control for the possibility that monetary policy might be influenced by 
different phases of the business cycle. To account for potential determinants related to 
international spillovers due to, for example, the uncovered interest rate parity, the lagged 
differential between the domestic and the foreign interest rate is considered. In this case we take into 
account that central banks (such as the ECB most recently) may be interested in exchange rate 
stabilization by setting their policy rates. Finally, lagged oil price changes might – according to 
the savings glut hypothesis - steer the transition between the regimes (Belke and Gros, 2014). 
Revenues of oil exporters increase in case of rising oil prices. The recycling of petrodollars by 
purchases of US Bonds might drive US and worldwide interest rates down, resulting in 
international monetary policy coordination.4 To assess the robustness of the results, we 
consider all choices of transition variables in the analysis. 
5. Empirical results 
To establish the presence of nonlinear effects in the Taylor rule we conduct a Lagrange 
multiplier test (Luukonen et al., 1988). Under the null hypothesis a linear model is assumed. If 
the linear specification in terms of the transition variable  
(6)  ∆݅௧ା௞ = 	 ߮଴ + ߮ଵ(ܿ௧) + ߮ଶ(ܿ௧)ݖ௧ + ߮ଷ(ܿ௧)ݖ௧ଶ + 		߮ସ(ܿ௧)ݖ௧ଷ+߳௧ା௞	  
is valid, the coefficients φi should be equal to 0 for i=2,3,4. Linearity is rejected if at least φi is 
different from 0 implying that the higher order terms are significant. The test statistic is 
distributed as Chi-squared with 3 degrees of freedom. Our findings for the two Taylor-rule 
specifications, excluding or including foreign interest rates, are shown in Tables 3 and 4. 
The linear specifications are rejected if lagged interest rate changes, the interest rate differential 
and oil price changes are chosen as transition variables. Note that these results are obtained 
for both specifications in most of the cases. Hence, spillovers are relevant. Since nonlinear 
effects are, however, less visible for the output gap if the foreign interest rate is included (Table 
4), the output gap is no longer considered as a potential transition variable. We have gained 
substantial evidence of non-linearity, because linearity has been rejected. The true transition 
variable is not known; the output gap is, however, not suitable for that. Nonlinear effects are 
important to explain monetary policy behaviour for all economies.  
                                                   
4 Lagged transition variables are preferred. In case of contemporary values the central bank would not 
be able to react to, for instance, change in oil prices in the same period. 
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Table 3. Teräsvirta test for nonlinearity excluding foreign interest rates 
ܒ ܃۹ ܃܁ Japan Germany/Eurozone 
݀݅(ݐ − 1)     (0.000) ** 
( 
(0.000) *** 
( 
(0.002) *** 
( 
(0.000) *** 
( 
݀݅(ݐ − 2) (0.003) *** (0.000) *** (0.000) *** (0.046) *** 
݃ܽ݌(ݐ − 1)     (0.031)**  
( 
(0.000) ***   (0.028) ** (0.000) *** 
( 
݃ܽ݌(ݐ − 2)     (0.009)***  (0.004) ** (0.084) * (0.000) *** 
݀݋݈݅(ݐ − 1) (0.517)  
( 
(0.001) **  (0.008)*** (0.086) * 
݀݋݈݅(ݐ − 2) (0.192)  (0.014) ** (0.015) ** (0.288) *** 
݅݀(ݐ − 1) (0.541)  (0.000) *** 
( 
(0.076) * (0.002) *** 
( 
݅݀(ݐ − 2) (0.693)  (0.000) *** (0.168)  (0.009) *** 
Note: The table displays the p-Values of the LM test for nonlinearity as described in Section 3.3 for the lagged 
changes in interest rates, the lagged output gap, the lagged change in oil prices and the lagged interest rate 
differential. The test is distributed as ߯ଶ with three degrees of freedom. For details, see Teräsvirta (1998). */**/*** 
implies rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10/5/1% significance level. 
 
Table 4. Teräsvirta test for nonlinearity including foreign interest rates 
ܒ ܃۹ ܃܁ Japan Germany/Eurozone 
݀݅(ݐ − 1)     (0.034) ** 
( 
(0.000) *** 
( 
(0.001) *** 
( 
(0.007) *** 
( 
݀݅(ݐ − 2) (0.000) *** (0.000) *** (0.001) *** (0.001) *** 
݃ܽ݌(ݐ − 1)     (0.508)  
( 
(0.000) ***   (0.061) *        (0.386)  
( 
݃ܽ݌(ݐ − 2)     (0.678)  (0.000) *** (0.031) ***        (0.087) * 
݀݋݈݅(ݐ − 1) (0.007) *** 
( 
(0.014) **  (0.076)* (0.000) *** 
( 
݀݋݈݅(ݐ − 2) (0.000) *** (0.009) *** (0.025) ** (0.000) *** 
݅݀(ݐ − 1) (0.000) *** (0.000) *** 
( 
(0.000) *** (0.000) *** 
( 
݅݀(ݐ − 2) (0.000) *** (0.000) *** (0.000) *** (0.000) *** 
Note: The table displays the p-Values of the LM test for nonlinearity as described in Section 3.3 for the lagged 
changes in interest rates, the lagged output gap, the lagged change in oil prices and the lagged interest rate 
differential. The test is distributed as ߯ଶ with three degrees of freedom. For details, see Teräsvirta (1998). */**/*** 
implies rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10/5/1% significance level. 
 
The nonlinear findings for the three transition variables (the lagged change of the interest rate, 
the lagged differential between the domestic and the foreign interest rate, and the lagged oil 
price changes) are reported in Tables 5 to 7. They are based on nonlinear least squares (NLS). 
Note that we pre-select a logistic transition function for each transition variable except for the 
interest rate differential where an exponential function can be more appropriate. We feel 
legitimised to do so because bigger interest rate differentials influence carry trades and Japan’s 
interest differential has been negative since the 1990s.5 In line with the results from the 
nonlinearity tests, the Taylor coefficients frequently differ between the regimes. Overall, 
                                                   
5 The results of the logistic specification are available on request. 
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Figure 3 reveals that the inclusion of international spillovers and, even more, nonlinear 
dynamics improves the explanatory power of the standard Taylor reaction function. This can 
be inferred from smaller deviations of the interest rates from the Taylor levels. In comparison 
both Figures 1 and 2 seem to include a negative trend that can be eliminated by taking 
nonlinearities into account.  
 
Figure 3. Deviations from a nonlinear Taylor rule including foreign interest rate 
 
Note: Logistic specification based on lagged interest rate change as a transition variable. 
 
Table 5. Nonlinear estimates based on lagged interest rate changes as transition variable  
Country ࢇ૙ ࢇ૚ ࢼ૚  ࢼ૚
ᇱ ࢼ૛  ࢼ૛
ᇱ ࢼ૜  ࢼ૜
ᇱ ࢽ૚ 
UK 3.858*** 
[5.055] 
-0.261 
[-0.504] 
0.506*** 
[3.759] 
0.577** 
[-2.556] 
1.027*** 
[15.336] 
-0.386  
[-1.552] 
0.257** 
[2.514] 
0.361** 
[2.478] 
3.014 
[1.144]  
US 0.372 
[0.312] 
1.237 
[1.176] 
0.411*** 
[0.637] 
0.712** 
[-1.275] 
-0.513 
[0.994] 
-0.159 
[-0.540] 
0.513*** 
[2.790] 
0.100 
[0.835] 
5.048 
[1.489] 
Japan 2.885*** 
[5.665] 
-3.167*** 
[-4.127] 
0.046 
[0.485] 
0.146 
[1.466] 
1.326*** 
[7.789] 
-0.352 
[-1.080] 
0.330*** 
[6.945] 
0.292*** 
[3.617] 
46.656* 
[1.671] 
Eurozone 3.431*** 
[4.546] 
-3.448*** 
[-5.468] 
-0.181** 
[-2.154] 
0.373*** 
[6.188] 
0.633*** 
[5.070] 
0.398* 
[1.947] 
0.024 
[0.419] 
0.915*** 
[9.014] 
1.490*** 
[2.935] 
Note: * Statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level. The coefficients are estimated 
by nonlinear least squares. T-values are given in parentheses. Logistic specification of the transition function. 
Coefficients refer to eq. (4). 
 
We now elaborate on the results for the different specifications with respect to the choice of 
the transition variable. We start with the case of lagged interest rate changes as the transition 
variable (case 1). The first regime corresponds to decreasing interest rates while the second 
1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
-5.0
-2.5
0.0
2.5
5.0
USANLDEV(1)
UKNLDEV(1)
JAPNLDEV(1)
GERNLDEV(1)
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corresponds to increasing interest rates. In the first regime, the output gap is positively signed 
for the US and the UK (coefficient β1 in Table 5, 3rd column).6 While the output gap is not 
significant for Japan, a negative impact of this variable is found for the euro area, which is 
striking. The inflation coefficient β2 turns out to be significant and positive for the UK, the euro 
area and Japan, but insignificant for the US (Table 5, 5th column). The coefficient β3 of the 
lagged foreign interest rate is estimated with a positive sign and turns out to be significant in 
all cases except for the euro area (Table 5, 7th column). More or less, the signs of the estimated 
parameters are in line with theoretical predictions except for the euro area. The results imply 
that the Fed, and the Bank of England are guided by business cycle considerations even if the 
interest rates have decreased over the previous quarter. 
In a regime of increasing interest rates (β1+β1’, Table 5, 3rd plus 4th column), the impact of the 
output gap becomes negative for the UK and the US while the variable is still not important 
for Japan. An interesting result is that the output gap coefficient for the euro area turns out to 
be positive now, as expected from theory. For Japan, the euro area and the UK, the lagged US 
interest rate becomes increasingly significant (β3+β3’, Table 5, 7th and 8th column). In contrast 
no difference is observed for the US. Overall, these findings show that periods of decreasing 
interest rates are more influenced by output developments, while the importance of 
international spillovers increases in periods of rising interest rates. 
The result suggests that coordination of monetary policy is closer in periods of rising interest 
rates. It appears consistent with recent evidence by the IMF in its spillover reports in the 
context of the envisaged Fed’s exit from unconventional monetary policies (IMF, 2013). The 
pattern that the monetary policy reaction in the euro area is only linked to domestic 
developments in times of increasing interesting rates might be traced back to the period after 
the German unification when the Bundesbank raised interest rates to fight inflationary 
pressure as a result of accelerating capacity rates. As outlined above, the Bundesbank was a 
leading example for monetary policy guided by price stability within the sample until 1999. 
 
Table 6. Nonlinear estimates based on change of the oil price as transition variable 
Country ࢇ૙ ࢇ૚ ࢼ૚  ࢼ૚
ᇱ ࢼ૛  ࢼ૛
ᇱ ࢼ૜  ࢼ૜
ᇱ ࢽ૚ 
UK 
4.392*** 
[4.008] 
-1.079 
[-0.561] 
0.959 
[1.483] 
-1.592 
[-1.202] 
0.746*** 
[9.264] 
0.117 
[0.565] 
0.394** 
[2.449] 
0.060 
[0.210] 
2.574 
[0.953] 
US 
1.954*** 
[2.473] 
-0.571 
[-1.087] 
0.332 
[0.824] 
-0.621* 
[1.966] 
1.022** 
[3.547] 
0.675** 
[-4.245] 
0.385*** 
[3.107] 
0.106* 
[1.529] 
74.012 
[0.779] 
Japan 
2.026*** 
[3.924] 
-0.708 
[-1.381] 
0.0514 
[0.403] 
0.138 
[0.832] 
1.0285*** 
[6.782] 
0.337* 
[1.750] 
0.3705*** 
[7.006] 
0.146** 
[2.387] 
19.848 
[0.737] 
Eurozone 
3.528*** 
[3.716] 
-1.900*** 
[-5.173] 
0.146*** 
[2.680] 
-0.167 
[-1.450] 
0.724*** 
[4.502] 
-0.164 
[-0.808] 
0.177 
[1.645] 
0.330*** 
[5.076] 
20.561 
[1.279] 
Note: * Statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level. The coefficients are estimated 
by nonlinear least squares. T-values are given in parentheses. Logistic specification of the transition function. 
Coefficients refer to eq. (4).  
                                                   
6 Note again that, according to eq. (4), the total effect is β1 + β1’. 
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Turning to the oil prices as the transition variable (case 2), we now distinguish between 
decreasing and increasing oil prices (Table 6). In case of decreasing oil prices, the inflation 
coefficient turns out to be significant for all economies (β2, Table 6, 5th column). Inflation 
becomes less important for the US and more important for Japan in case of positive oil price 
changes (β2+β2’, Table 6, 5th plus 6th column). For the euro area the inflation impact stays 
positive. As before, the importance of foreign interest rates increases in periods of rising oil 
prices for the US, Japan and the euro area (β3+β3’, Table 6, 7th and 8th column).  The impact of 
the foreign interest rate for the UK is the same in both regimes.  
Finally, we turn to case 3 in which the lagged (home versus foreign) interest rate differential is 
chosen as the transition variable (Table 7). Since we rely on an exponential function, the first 
regime corresponds to a small interest rate differential relative to the US while the second 
corresponds to a large interest rate differential. For the UK, the coefficients for the output gap 
and inflation are well signed for a small interest rate differential (β1 and β2, Table 7, 3rd and 5th 
column). However, large interest rate differentials are associated with wrongly signed 
coefficients (β1+β1’ and β2+β2’, Table 7, 4th and 6th column). A similar pattern can be observed 
for the inflation coefficient of Japan. However, the output gap coefficient of Japan is correctly 
signed for a large interest rate differential (β1+β1’, Table 7, columns 3 and 4), it is wrongly 
signed for a small interest rate differential (β1, Table 7, 3rd column). In addition, international 
interest rate spillovers appear to be stronger for a large interest rate differential in case of Japan 
(β3+β3’, Table 7, 7th and 8th column). The picture for the euro area is different (Table 7, 4th row, 
a negative coefficient for the output gap and an insignificant inflation coefficient are observed 
in case of small interest rate differentials (β1 and β2). Large interest rate differentials lead to a 
positive inflation coefficient (β2+β2’) while the importance of the US interest rate decreases 
(β3+β3’). In general, US monetary policy shows less evidence of regime switches (Table 7, 2nd 
row). The only coefficient which changes is the impact of the output gap when large interest 
rate differentials are considered. 
 
Table 7. Nonlinear estimates based on the lagged interest rate differential as transition variable 
Country ࢇ૙ ࢇ૚ ࢼ૚  ࢼ૚
ᇱ ࢼ૛  ࢼ૛
ᇱ ࢼ૜  ࢼ૜
ᇱ ࢽ૚ 
UK 
1.567* 
[1.797] 
3.557** 
[2.700] 
0.147** 
[3.552] 
-0.516** 
[-4.852] 
0.353* 
[1.753] 
-0.626** 
[-2.055] 
0.743*** 
[5.197] 
0.462 
[1.588] 
0.038*** 
[3.592] 
US 
-0.540*** 
[-3.411] 
-6.785*** 
[-15.432] 
-0.153*** 
[-3.707] 
0.844*** 
[8.912] 
0.333** 
[2.254] 
-0.124 
[-0.667] 
1.012*** 
[32.698] 
-0.028 
[-0.482] 
0.226*** 
[14.382] 
Japan 
0.869*** 
[2.240] 
-9.118*** 
[-5.719] 
-0.221** 
[-4.008] 
0.405*** 
[3.497] 
0.561*** 
[5.447] 
-0.758*** 
[-3.326] 
0.815*** 
[13.337] 
0.261* 
[1.972] 
0.001*** 
[5.370] 
Eurozone 
-0.307 
[-0.752] 
3.207*** 
[2.380] 
-0.170*** 
[-4.306] 
0.199 
[1.426] 
-0.088 
[-0.539] 
1.326*** 
[4.251] 
1.068*** 
[13.334] 
-0.860*** 
[-5.118] 
0.994 
[6.778] 
Note: * Statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level. The coefficients are estimated 
by nonlinear least squares. T-values are given in parentheses. Exponential specification of the transition function. 
Coefficients refer to eq. (4). 
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6. Conclusion  
This study has allowed for international spillovers and various nonlinear adjustment patterns 
when analysing monetary policy decisions against the background of the Taylor rule. Both 
effects are well-suited to capture actual central bank behaviour. Our approach fits the data 
reasonably well and reduces deviations compared to standard Taylor reaction functions. We 
identify several cases where Taylor rule coefficients change their sign between the regimes, 
suggesting that nonlinear dynamics are important. It is also worthwhile mentioning that the 
magnitude of spillover effects is always positive and frequently larger compared to the output 
gap and inflation as traditional determinants.  
From a general point of view, our findings suggest that nonlinear patterns in central bank 
behaviour can be due to several aspects. On the one hand, coefficients of the Taylor rule are 
different for expansionary and contractionary periods. In general, lagged changes of US 
interest rates are even more significant in times of increasing domestic interest rates. Hence, 
expansionary monetary policy decisions by the other central bank under observation have 
been more frequently related to changes in the US monetary policy stance. International 
spillovers resulting from interest rate differentials and different oil price pattern also introduce 
fluctuations in the Taylor reaction function coefficients. In contrast, the output gap turns out 
to be a less important determinant to model nonlinear dynamics. 
Overall, we confirm the main argument of Taylor (2013) that international coordination has 
become a more important aspect of monetary policy. Our results show that the Taylor rule 
framework turns out to be useful for the assessment of monetary policy even after the 
millennium once nonlinear dynamics and international spillovers are included. Future 
research beyond this framework should for example be able to shed some light on the issue of 
policy coordination in a zero interest rate environment.  
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